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Renwick v. News & Observer Publishing Co.: North Carolina
Rejects the False Light Invasion of Privacy Tort
The false light invasion of privacy tort, which frequently is associated with
and compared to the defamation tort, has been widely accepted by courts and
commentators. The status of this tort in North Carolina was unsettled until
recently. Although the court of appeals had indicated its willingness to recog-
nize the false light tort,1 the North Carolina Supreme Court never had con-
fronted the issue squarely.
In Renwick v. News & Observer Publishing Co.2 the North Carolina
Supreme Court addressed the question whether an individual injured by a false
statement that refers to him should be entitled to maintain a false light invasion
of privacy cause of action. A divided court answered this question in the nega-
tive,3 stating that a person who alleges such an injury must recover under the
well-established torts of libel and slander.4 Although a number of arguments
support the court's refusal to recognize the false light tort, its decision may deny
relief to some worthy plaintiffs. This Note analyzes the logic underlying the
court's conclusion, discusses the implications of the decision, and advances an
alternative solution to the issue presented in Renwick.
The controversy in Renwick arose out of an editorial published in two
North Carolina daily newspapers. 5 The editorial vehemently denounced various
negative reports and charges emanating from federal officials regarding the mi-
nority recruitment and enrollment policy of the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill. It attributed to Renwick, 6 a university official, a published allega-
tion that the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill had denied admission
to approximately 800 black applicants between 1975 and 1978 because of their
race.7 The editorial claimed that this allegation was the catalyst for the negative
1. See Brown v. Boney, 41 N.C. App. 636, 255 S.E.2d 784, disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 294, 259
S.E.2d 910 (1979); Barr v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 13 N.C. App. 388, 185 S.E.2d 714 (1972).
2. 310 N.C. 312, 312 S.E.2d 405 (1984). Plaintiff Renwick filed duplicate actions against the
News & Observer Publishing Company and the Greensboro News Company. The cases were con-
solidated for appeal. Id. at 313, 312 S.E.2d at 406.
3. Id. at 326, 312 S.E.2d at 413. For a discussion of the dissenting opinions, see infra notes 13
& 15.
4. Renwick, 310 N.C. at 322, 312 S.E.2d at 411.
5. The editorial, titled "And He Calls It Bias?," is included verbatim in the North Carolina
Supreme Court opinion. Renwick, 310 N.C. at 314-15, 312 S.E.2d at 407. The editorial originally
was printed in the Raleigh Times on April 22, 1981, and was republished in the Greensboro Daily
News & Record on April 26, 1981. See id. at 314, 312 S.E.2d at 407.
6. At the time of the trial, plaintiff Hayden B. Renwick was Associate Dean of the College of
Arts and Sciences at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Prior to 1978 Renwick was in
charge of the minority admissions program at the Chapel Hill campus. Renwick v. News & Ob-
server Publishing Co., 63 N.C. App. 200, 204, 304 S.E.2d 593, 596 (1983), rev'd, 310 N.C. 312, 312
S.E.2d 405 (1984).
7. Renwick, 310 N.C. at 314, 312 S.E.2d at 407. The text of the 1978 newspaper article in
which Renwick's "allegations" were made was not part of the record on appeal. See id. at 320, 312
S.E.2d at 410. The clear implication of the editorial, however, was that Renwick's 1978 "allega-
tions" suggested that the denial of admission to some black applicants was the result of unfair dis-
crinination. See Renwick v. News & Observer Publishing Co., 63 N.C. App. 200, 219, 304 S.E.2d
593, 605 (1983), rev'd, 310 N.C. 312, 312 S.E.2d 405 (1984).
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reports and charges from the federal government.8
Contending that this statement in the editorial was false, Renwick sued
both newspapers, relying on the tort theories of libel per se and false light inva-
sion of privacy. 9 The trial court dismissed both claims for failure to state a
cause of action.10 The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
Renwick's complaint stated valid causes of action for both libel and false light
invasion of privacy.1 On appeal, however, the North Carolina Supreme Court
reversed the court of appeals on both the libel and false light issues. 12 The most
significant feature of the supreme court's decision is its conclusion that North
8. Renwick, 310 N.C. at 314, 312 S.E.2d at 407.
9. Id. at 313, 317, 312 S.E.2d at 406-07. For a brief definition of defamation, see infra note 58.
Recovery for libel requires proof that a written defamatory statement which was both untrue and
unprivileged was published about the plaintiff. See Arnold v. Sharpe, 296 N.C. 533, 537-40, 251
S.E.2d 452, 455-57 (1979). TheArnold court outlined the contours of libel per se in North Carolina.
Libel per se is the publication, expressed in writing or printing, or by signs and pic-
tures which when considered alone without innuendo tends to subject one to ridicule, pub-
lic hatred, contempt or disgrace, or tends to impeach one in his trade or profession. It is
not essential that the words involve an imputation of crime, moral turpitude or immoral
conduct. . . . When a publication is libelous per se, a prima facie presumption of malice
and a conclusive presumption of legal injury arise entitling the victim to recover at least
nominal damages without proof of special damages.
Id. at 537-38, 251 S.E.2d at 455.
Plaintiffs often favor a false light cause of action because some false statements are compensable
under the false light theory even though they are not sufficiently offensive to be defamatory. See
infra notes 61, 67 & 71 and accompanying text. "The falsehoods in privacy litigation have tradition.
ally been of a less serious character than that for which relief is granted in defamation." M. MAYER,
RIGHTS OF PRIVACY 118 (1972). False light generally resembles defamation in that it requires publi-
cation of an untrue statement regarding the plaintiff. Instead of applying the defamation standard,
however, the false statement usually will satisfy the false light claim if it "would be highly offensive
to a reasonable person." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 652E (1977).
10. Renwick, 310 N.C. at 315, 312 S.E.2d at 407. The trial court judgment dismissing the
complaint did not explain why the complaint was dismissed. Renwick v. News & Observer Publish-
ing Co., 63 N.C. App. 200, 203, 304 S.E.2d 593, 595-96 (1983), rev'd, 310 N.C. 312, 312 S.E.2d 405
(1984).
11. Renwick v. News & Observer Publishing Co., 63 N.C. App. 200, 242, 304 S.E.2d 593, 618
(1983), rev'd, 310 N.C. 312, 312 S.E.2d 405 (1984).
12. Renwick, 310 N.C. at 326, 312 S.E.2d at 414. The supreme court remanded the consoli-
dated Renwick cases to the court of appeals with instructions to remand the cases to the trial court to
permit the judgments dismissing plaintiff's actions to be reinstated. Id.
In each case plaintiff's libel claim was dismissed because it failed to satisfy the requirements for
libel per se; the editorial reference to plaintiff reasonably was subject to both a defamatory and a
nondefamatory interpretation. Id. at 318, 312 S.E.2d at 409. The court stated:
But defamatory words to be libelous per se must be susceptible of but one meaning and of
such nature that the court can presume as a matter of law that they tend to disgrace and
degrade the party or hold him up to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, or cause him to be
shunned and avoided.
Id.
The court noted that in addition to libel per se two other types of libel are recognized in North
Carolina: false statements susceptible of both a defamatory and a nondefamatory interpretation and
false statements that do not appear to be defamatory but become so when "considered with innu-
endo, colloquium, and explanatory circumstances." Id. at 316, 312 S.E.2d at 408. These latter types
of libel are known as libel per quod. The court noted that Renwick's complaint failed to allege the
essential elements for either of these alternative libel theories. Id. at 316-17, 312 S.E.2d at 408. The
complaint did not state the first alternative theory because there was no allegation that the editorial
was susceptible of both a defamatory and a nondefamatory meaning and that the defamatory mean-
ing was intended by the speaker and understood by the audience. Id. The complaint did not estab-
lish libel per quod because special damages, an essential element of libel per quod, were not pleaded.
Id.
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Carolina does not recognize a cause of action for false light invasion of
privacy. 13
The court offered two policy reasons to support its decision not to counte-
nance a false light tort. First, the court stated that plaintiffs claiming injury
from false statements are afforded adequate legal remedies under traditional def-
amation actions, and therefore a false light cause of action is superfluous. 14 Sec-
ond, the court noted that creating a false light cause of action would not be
prudent because such an action increases tension between the law of torts and
the first amendment guarantee of freedom of the press. 15
It has been almost a century since the invasion of privacy tort was sug-
gested; an acclaimed 1890 Harvard Law Review article urged courts to recognize
such a cause of action. 16 In 1960 Dean William L. Prosser undertook a compre-
hensive evaluation of relevant cases; he concluded that the invasion of privacy
theory advanced in the 1890 article had been used and interpreted by courts to
create four essentially independent and distinct invasion of privacy torts.' 7
"False light in the public eye" was one of these torts.' 8 Prosser defined and
distinguished the false light tort as follows:
The false light need not necessarily be. . .defamatory. . . . [I]t
must be something that would be objectionable to the ordinary reason-
able man under the circumstances ....
The false light cases obviously differ from those of intrusion, or
disclosure of private facts. The interest protected is clearly that of rep-
utation. . . .There is a resemblance to disclosure; but the two differ
in that one involves truth and the other lies, one private or secret facts
and the other invention. Both require publicity. 19
13. See id. at 326, 312 S.E.2d at 413. Justice Meyer filed a separate opinion in which he con-
curred in part and dissented in part. He agreed that plaintiff's complaint did not state a valid claim
for libel per se, but disagreed with the majority determination that North Carolina should not recog-
nize the false light tort. See id. at 326-27, 312 S.E.2d at 414-15 (Meyer, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice Frye also dissented from the majority holding that no false light cause of
action should exist in North Carolina. See id. at 331, 312 S.E.2d at 416 (Frye, J., dissenting).
14. Id. at 323, 312 S.E.2d at 412; see infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
15. Renwick, 310 N.C. at 323, 312 S.E.2d at 412. In the dissenting portion of his opinion,
Justice Meyer disputed the first amendment rationale advanced by the majority. "The First Amend-
ment provides no absolute protection for any individual or member of the news media to make false
material statements of fact and then to draw defamatory conclusions therefrom." Id. at 330, 312
S.E.2d at 416 (Meyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see infra notes 86-88 and accom-
panying text.
16. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. Rlv. 193 (1890). "The article by
Warren and Brandeis had a profound and almost immediate impact and 'has come to be regarded as
the outstanding example of the influence of legal periodicals upon the American law.'" Renwick,
310 N.C. at 321, 312 S.E.2d at 411 (quoting Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. R-v. 383, 383 (1960)).
17. See Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. Rnv. 383, 389 (1960).
18. Prosser described the four privacy torts as follows:
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs.
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff.
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye.
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or likeness.
Id.
19. Id. at 400. Prosser also noted that false light differs from both intrusion and appropriation
because false light protects the reputational interest, id., whereas intrusion protects an individual's
19851
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Since 1960 this analysis of invasion of privacy has been accepted widely by state
courts and other authorities.20 One authority recently documented that courts
in thirty-seven states,21 including the North Carolina Court of Appeals prior to
Renwick, 22 had recognized a false light cause of action. The states that have
adopted or recognized a false light tort, however, differ greatly in defining the
elements of the claim and the interests protected by the tort.23 Although it is
impossible to formulate a universal definition of a false light cause of action, the
Restatement (Second) approach probably is the most commonly cited. Accord-
ing to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, false light invasion of privacy is de-
fined as follows:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the
other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other
for invasion of his privacy, if
(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to
the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the
other would be placed. 24
Prior to Renwick, false light was invoked or mentioned only rarely in North
Carolina cases. Although the court of appeals in Renwick cited the 1938 case of
Flake v. Greensboro News Co.25 for the proposition that a false light cause of
action had been recognized in North Carolina, 26 the supreme court disputed this
interpretation of Flake and implied that the Flake decision rested upon the ap-
propriation type of invasion of privacy rather than false light.27 In Flake plain-
interest in his mental tranquility, id. at 392, and appropriation protects an individual's proprietary
interest in his name and likeness, id. at 406. For a more complete discussion of the definitions and
distinct characteristics of the four privacy torts, see W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 117 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984).
20. For a state-by-state evaluation of each of the four torts, see Kovner, Recent Developments in
Intrusion, Private Facts, False Light and Commercialization Claims, in 2 PRACTICING LAW INSTI-
TUTE, COMMUNICATIONS LAW 1983, at 292, 366-92 (1983). "With few exceptions, courts con-
fronting the issue as a matter of first impression will recognize the four categories perceived by
Prosser and adopted by the Restatement." Id. at 366; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) o TORTS
§§ 652A-652E (1977). A survey of the relevant cases reveals that most courts which have consid-
ered the issue have recognized Prosser's four torts as separate and distinct torts comprising the
general invasion of privacy tort. Thus, in most jurisdictions it would be inaccurate to speak of the
"invasion of privacy" tort without specifying which type of invasion of privacy has been alleged.
21. See Kovner, supra note 20, at 366-92.
22. See id. at 384 (citing Brown v. Boney, 41 N.C. App. 636, 647-48, 255 S.E.2d 784, 791, disc.
rev. denied, 298 N.C. 294, 259 S.E.2d 910 (1979)); see also Barr v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 13
N.C. App. 388, 392, 185 S.E.2d 714, 717 (1972) (jury could find invasion of privacy when defendant
published likeness of someone other than plaintiff and published plaintiff's name as identification).
23. Comment, False Light: Invasion of Privacy?, 15 TuLSA L.J. 113, 113-14 (1979) ("Neither
the elements of the tort. . . [of false light] nor the interests it seeks to protect have been adequately
defined so as to allow consistent application.").
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977); see supra note 9.
25. 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938).
26. Renwick v. News & Observer Publishing Co., 63 N.C. App. 200, 240, 304 S.E.2d 593, 617
(1983), rev'd, 310 N.C. 312, 312 S.E.2d 405 (1984).
27. Renwick, 310 N.C. at 322, 312 S.E.2d at 411. The Renwick court stated:
Although Flake involved overtones of "false light" publicity, we neither reached nor de-
cided the precise question presented by the plaintiff here-whether publicity by a defend-
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tiff sued for libel and for invasion of privacy. The court dismissed the libel
claim 28 but held that plaintiff did state a valid privacy claim.2 9 Plaintiff's suit
was predicated on a newspape3r advertisement in which a picture of plaintiff
dressed in a bathing suit was used as an endorsement for a bread product. 30
Plaintiff had not consented to the use of her picture in this manner; the newspa-
per mistakenly had used the wrong picture.3 ' "The clearest context of a[n]...
[appropriation] claim is the unauthorized use of plaintiff's name or likeness for
purposes of advertisement or promotion." 32 In Flake the court stated, "[W]e
are presently called upon to decide.. . the right of an individual to prohibit the
unauthorized use of an image of her features and figure in connection with and
as part of an advertisement."' 33 Thus, the language and reasoning in Flake most
directly and strongly support the conclusion that the type of privacy claim on
which the court was relying was the as yet unarticulated appropriation theory.3
4
This analysis is corroborated by the fact that the court seemed to stress nonpecu-
niary injury plaintiff may have suffered only when dealing with plaintiff's libel
claim, leading to the inference that plaintiff's privacy claim was based solely on
pecuniary injury.35 The focus of the court's privacy discussion was the "prop-
erty" interest a person has in his name and likeness.
36
The next North Carolina case apparently involving a false light tort was
Barr v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.,37 decided by the court of ap-
peals in 1972. In Barr the court of appeals held that a plaintiff could recover
nominal damages on an invasion of privacy theory.38 Although the Barr court
never expressly acknowledged that it was permitting recovery on a false light
theory, false light was the invasion of privacy theory most supported by the
facts. 39
ant which places a plaintiff in a false light before the public gives rise to a claim for which
relief can be granted upon a theory of invasion of privacy.
Id. For the distinction between false light and appropriation, see supra notes 18-19 and accompany-
ing text.
28. Flake, 212 N.C. at 790, 195 S.E. at 62.
29. Id. at 793, 195 S.E. at 64.
30. Id. at 782-83, 195 S.E. at 57-58.
31. Id. at 783, 195 S.E. at 58.
32. See Kovner, supra note 20, at 348.
33. Flake, 212 N.C. at 791, 195 S.E. at 63.
34. Id. at 793, 195 S.E. at 64. Prosser did not articulate his categorization of the invasion of
privacy tort until 22 years after the Flake decision. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
The Flake court noted:
If it be conceded that the name of a person is a valuable asset in connection with an adver-
tising enterprise, then it must likewise be conceded that his face or features are likewise of
value. Neither can be used for such a purpose without the consent of the owner without
giving rise to a cause of action.
Flake, 212 N.C. at 793, 195 S.E. at 64.
35. Flake, 212 N.C. at 783, 785-90, 195 S.E. at 58-62.
36. Id. at 792, 195 S.E. at 64.
37. 13 N.C. App. 388, 185 S.E.2d 714 (1972). Barr sued the telephone company on an invasion
of privacy theory following an incident in which the telephone company mistakenly placed the pic-
ture of a much older man, rather than plaintiff's picture, over plaintiff's name in a yellow pages
advertisement for plaintiff's employer's business. Id. at 388-89, 185 S.E.2d at 715.
38. Id. at 393, 185 S.E.2d at 717.
39. The facts in Barr did not support an appropriation cause of action because plaintiff gave his
1985]
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The final pre-Renwick North Carolina case addressing a false light action
was the 1978 Brown v. Boney decision.4 Although its language was dictum, the
court of appeals unambiguously indicated that it would have recognized a false
light tort had plaintiff's complaint pleaded the essential elements, 41 Because
neither Barr nor Brown advanced beyond the court of appeals, Renwick afforded
the supreme court its first opportunity since Flake to address the validity of a
false light claim.
The supreme court in Renwick advanced two primary reasons for not
adopting the false light tort.42 Those reasons focus on the major points of schol-
arly discussion and debate regarding the merits of the false light tort.
The first reason cited by the court for its rejection of the false light tort was
the court's perception that the cause of action is largely unnecessary because
most of the same wrongs can be redressed in a defamation action.43 The court
commented that "llt has often been recognized that claims for false light inva-
sion of privacy and claims for libel or slander are at least very similar and that
many of the same considerations apply to each type of claim," 44 and intimated
that the situations in which an otherwise remediless plaintiff would be afforded
relief under a false light theory in North Carolina would not be of sufficient
number or importance to make the false light tort worth recognizing. 45 There-
fore, the restraints placed on a free press by the recognition of a false light
claim 46 and the judicial time required to consider false light claims, most of
consent for the use of his name and photograph. There was no allegation that the telephone com-
pany had gained a pecuniary benefit as a result of placing plaintiff's name under the picture of
another person. Many of the authorities cited by the Barr court, however, lead to the inference that
the court believed it was considering an appropriation claim. See also Kovner, supra note 20, at 385
(citing Barr for the proposition that North Carolina recognizes appropriation invasion of privacy).
Similarly, an intrusion cause of action was not supported by the facts because there was no prying
into or interference with plaintiff's private affairs or concerns. Finally, plaintiff could not establish a
case for public disclosure of private facts because his name was not a private fact that plaintiff was
entitled to keep out of the public view. Plaintiff's case fits best into the false light mold because his
claimed injury resulted from the false impression given to the public when his name was placed
under the picture of an older man.
40. 41 N.C. App. 636, 255 S.E.2d 784, disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 294, 259 S.E.2d 910 (1979).
Brown sued defendant newspaper editor on the theories of libel and invasion of privacy after defend-
ant published plaintiff's name in a driver's license revocation list. Id.
41. Id. at 647-48, 255 S.E.2d at 791. The Brown court stated:
[W]ith regard to invasion of privacy of the false light variety, it is essential that the matter
published concerning the plaintiff is not true, and it is sufficient if the matter published
attributes to him characteristics, conduct, or beliefs that are false so that he is portrayed
before the public in a false position.
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977)). The court concluded that Brown
failed to state a false light claim because he did not allege that the statement was false. Id.
42. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
43. The Renwick court cited and extensively quoted the opinions of Dean Prosser to make its
point. "'In many if not most cases. . . the false light is defamatory and an action for libel or
slander will also lie.'" Renwick, 310 N.C. at 325, 312 S.E.2d at 413 (quoting W. PROSSER, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 813 (4th ed. 1971)). "'The question may well be raised...
whether. . .[false light]. . . is not capable of swallowing up and engulfing the whole law of public
defamation .... "" Id. at 324, 312 S.E.2d at 412 (quoting Prosser, supra note 17, at 400-01).
44. Id. at 323, 312 S.E.2d at 412.
45. Id. at 326, 312 S.E.2d at 413. The court implicitly acknowleged that its holding would
circumscribe the remedies available to plaintiffs. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
46. For a more complete treatment of this issue, see infra notes 86-96 and accompanying text.
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which already are covered by a defamation action, would be too costly when
compared with the limited benefit a false light cause of action might afford de-
serving claimants.4 7
Many of the premises relied on by the Renwick court to determine whether
false light is merely an unrecessary and inefficient duplication of existing causes
of action are debated intensely.48 The disagreement centers primarily on the
question of what interests the false light tort is intended to protect.49 The North
Carolina Supreme Court demonstrated its adherence to Prosser's conceptualiza-
tion of the false light tort, including his basic tenet that, like defamation, the
primary purpose of the false light action is to protect an individual's reputational
interest.50 Although this view undeniably is prominent, a significant line of au-
thority exists that espouses the view that false light does not protect the reputa-
tional interest but instead protects the individual's interest in his peace of mind
and mental tranquility.5 1 Some who hold this latter view argue that if the false
light tort, like defamation, is designed to protect a person's reputation, then no
meaningful distinction between false light and defamation can be made.52
The privacy tort that Prosser labeled "false light in the public eye" is
47. The Renwick court stated:
Given the First Amendment limitations placed upon... false light invasion of pri-
vacy actions by Hill, we think that such additional remedies as we might be required to
make available to plaintiffs should we recognize false light invasion of privacy claims are
not sufficient to justify the recognition. . . of such. . . inherently constitutionally suspect
claims for relief. Additionally, the recognition of claims for relief for false light invasions
of privacy would reduce judicial efficiency by requiring our courts to consider two claims
for the same relief which, if not identical, would not differ significantly.
Renwick, 310 N.C. at 326, 312 S.E.2d at 413.
Similar sentiments can be found elsewhere. "In the false light cases another remedy most often
does exist. When it does not,... the plaintiff's interest should be subjugated." Note, Right of
Privacy: Is "False Light" Recognized in California?-Werner v. Times Mirror Co. (CaL 1961), 50
CALIF. L. Rlv. 357, 364 (1962).
48. See Comment, Privacy: The Search for a Standard, 11 WAKE FoRESr L. Rxv. 659, 669-70
(1975).
49. See Kovner, supra note 20, at 293. Different authorities attach fundamentally different
meanings to common terminology. Id.
50. See Renwick, 310 N.C. at 322-24, 312 S.E.2d at 412 (citing Prosser, supra note 17, at 400-
01); see, eg., Note, Tort Recovery for Invasion of Privacy, 59 NEB. L. REv. 808, 825 (1980) ("The
quintescence [sic] of the false light action is the protection of the plaintiff's reputation rather than his
or her right to be free from the public scrutiny.").
51. See, eg., Froelich v. Adair, 213 Kan. 357, 360, 516 P.2d 993, 996-97 (1973) ("[Invasion of
privacy] is a cause of action based upon injury to plaintiff's emotions and his mental suffering;...
[defamation] is a remedy for injury to plaintiff's reputation."); Thermo v. New England Newspaper
Publishing Co., 306 Mass. 54, 57, 27 N.E.2d 753, 755 (1940); Kovner, supra note 20, at 326; Com-
ment, supra note 23, at 115-19, 137 (suggesting that mental anguish should be the sole measure for
recovery in privacy cases and harm to reputation should not be compensable under privacy claims);
Comment, supra note 48, at 665-69. The label "invasion of privacy" and its connotations, including
the primary interest of an individual in keeping his private affairs private, lend credence to the
argument that the privacy right protects something other than reputation.
One commentator has suggested that different constitutional interests compete with the privacy
and defamation torts. See id. at 665. She claims that free public discussion is the constitutional
interest competing with defamation whereas the public's right to know is the constitutional interest
competing with invasion of privacy. See id. This asserted difference in the constitutional interests
protected by the different torts, however, does not contribute anything substantive to the debate of
whether defamation and false light are essentially the same tort.
52. See Ellis, Damages and the Privacy Tort: Sketching a "Legal Profile;" 64 IowA L. REV.
1111, 1117 (1979); Comment, supra note 23, at 126.
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closely analogous to defamation .... As Prosser and his followers
have defined false light, there is no clear boundary between it and libel.
Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of facts that would amount to defama-
tion that would not also fit under false light. .... 53
Ironically, the authorities that subscribe to the view that false light and defama-
tion both protect primarily the reputational interest often find other distinguish-
ing features.5 4
If false light protects the reputational interest, then the only rationale for
recognizing it as a separate tort would be to provide a diluted "defamation"
action for individuals unable to satisfy the stringent requirements of traditional
defamation theory. 55 On the other hand, using false light to protect an individ-
ual's interest in remaining free from serious mental suffering provides a separate
basis for compensating a person for a specific wrong inflicted upon him. Under
this approach, false light appears to have a meaning and purpose altogether in-
dependent of the defamation action; it responds to the criticism that a false light
action is merely a "watered-down" version of defamation.
5 6
The "interest protected" distinction probably would have no significant
practical effect when the false statement also is defamatory because in addition
to a damaged reputation, a defamatory statement almost always will cause
mental anguish. When the falsehood does not reach the defamatory level but
nonetheless causes the plaintiff to suffer mental anguish, 57 however, the recogni-
tion that false light protects mental tranquility, rather than the reputational in-
terest, makes a practical difference. This result follows because the functional
differences between false light and defamation are maintained, and the plaintiff is
compensated for his injury even though the statement was not defamatory.
Another significant distinction between false light and defamation is that
the false light action is more comprehensive than the defamation action.
Although both false light and defamation theories permit plaintiffs to recover for
injuries caused by falsehoods published about them, false light is more liberal
than defamation. Defamation requires that the falsehood cause the subject to
suffer public contempt or avoidance or to suffer in his business or employment;58
53. Ellis, supra note 52, at 1117.
54. See infra notes 58-73 and accompanying text.
55. For a harsh criticism of such a result, see Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and
Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326 (1966).
[I]f the colonization of defamation by privacy does take place, it will only be because
by the use of a fiction the courts have turned at last to the reform of the law of defamation.
It will not be because they have perceived that logically defamation is subsumed in privacy.
They will simply be calling false statements by a new name.
Id. at 341. Although Kalven did not advocate liberalizing defamation law, in making his point he
asked, "[If the desire is to relax somewhat the criteria of what is defamatory, would it not be more
rational to do that openly and directly?" Id. at 340.
56. See supra note 55.
57. For illustrative cases, see infra notes 61 & 70-71 and accompanying text.
58. Although there are numerous formulations of the test for determining whether material is
defamatory, a recent case stated that material is defamatory (libel per se) if it "tends to subject one to
ridicule, public hatred, contempt or disgrace, or tends to impeach one in his trade or profession."
Arnold v. Sharpe, 296 N.C. 533, 537, 251 S.E.2d 452, 455 (1979); see also McCall v. Courier-Journal
& Louisville Times, 623 S.W.2d 882, 884 (Ky. 1981); supra note 9.
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a false light action only requires that the statements be "highly offensive" or
cause severe emotional harm.59 False light allows some statements 6° to be ac-
tionable even though they do not reach the level of being defamatory. 61 Not
only do the courts and authorities that define false light and defamation as pro-
tecting different interests62 recognize this distinction, but virtually all authori-
ties-including Dean Prosser,63 the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 64 and the
North Carolina Supreme Court in Renwick 6 5-accept the distinction as a genu-
ine difference between defamation and false light.
66
This distinction has led to arguments both in favor of and against recogni-
tion of the false light tort. Some commentators have criticized the false light
theory because it is too favorable to plaintiffs; it allows a plaintiff to recover
when the falsehood does not reach the level of defamation.67 Another criticism
was expressed by the Renwick court, which stated that freedom of the press
59. Although there is apparently no clear authority for the proposition, it seems logical that the
test for an actionable false light statement should depend on which interest the cause of action is
deemed to protect. If false light protects the plaintiff's peace of mind or mental tranquility, severe
emotional harm should be required; on the other hand, if false light protects the plaintiff's reputa-
tional interest, the cause of action should require a statement that "would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person." See supra note 9.
In reality, courts and other authorities usually do not draw such bright-line distinctions,
Kovner, supra note 20, at 293; often plaintiffs in false light cases recover even though the false light is
less than "highly offensive." See id. at 327.
Some commentators who believe false light protects an individual's mental tranquility find the
"highly offensive" test satisfactory for determining whether a person is entitled to recover under false
light for mental suffering. "[I]t appears that the purpose of. . . the 'highly offensive' test used by
the RESTATEMENT is to ensure that the false statement would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person, and not only the hypersensitive individual, so as to result in mental suffering." Comment,
supra note 23, at 121. Analyzing mental suffering under the "highly offensive" standard seems ac-
ceptable if one remembers that the sole interest being protected is mental tranquility and that the
defamation should compensate the plaintiff for any injury to reputation.
60. See supra note 9.
61. This result would occur if the false statement does not satisfy the strict test for a defamatory
statement, supra note 58, but nevertheless is the type of falsehood that would cause a reasonable
person to suffer the consequences of a false light statement, see supra note 59.
Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951), is a classic illustration of the use
of the false light tort to compensate a person for injury resulting from a nondefamatory falsehood.
For the facts of Leverton and further discussion, see infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text. See
also Kovner, supra note 20, at 326 (stating that although false light is somewhat similar to defama-
tion, a statement that is not actionable under defamation may be actionable under false light); Com-
ment, The Absence of False Light from the Wisconsin Privacy Statute, 66 MARQ. L. Rtv. 99, 121
(1982) (noting that a defamatory statement "is facially more outrageous" than a nondefamatory false
light statement).
62. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
63. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 19, § 117, at 864.
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E comment b (1977).
65. Renwick, 310 N.C. at 325, 312 S.E.2d at 413.
66. See supra text accompanying note 54.
67. See Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REv. 1093, 1121 (1962)
(warning that the false light tort will permit plaintiffs to recover for falsehoods while avoiding many
of the restrictions applicable to defamation); Comment, supra note 23, at 122-23. The student au-
thor, although generally favoring the false light tort, notes that a plaintiff might be able to recover on
the basis of a false but laudatory statement. "[Tihis is precisely the type of case in which recovery
should not be permitted under a false light theory." Id. at 123. The student author, however, also
notes, "[A] plaintiff should be permitted to recover to the full extent of her mental injury under a
false light cause of action in those instances in which the falsehood does not rise to the level of being
defamatory." Id. at 138.
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would be seriously and unreasonably curtailed if plaintiffs are permitted to re-
cover for nondefamatory false statements.6 8 Other authorities, however, note
that a person may suffer a genuine injury as a direct result of a false statement,
and yet the statement may not satisfy the requirements for a defamation claim.6 9
Relying on this rationale, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit in Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co.7 0 allowed recovery for a false light claim
when a picture of the innocent plaintiff lying injured on the street after being
struck by an automobile was published by defendant in conjunction with an
article about the carelessness of pedestrians near highways. 7 1 The Leverton
court concluded:
[W]e think this . . . publication was an actionable invasion of
plaintiff's right of privacy. [Although] she was "newsworthy" with
regard to her traffic accident. . . [t]his use of her picture had nothing
. . . to do with her accident. It related to the general subject of traffic
accidents and pedestrian carelessness. Yet.. . the little girl. . . was
at the time of her accident not careless and the motorist was. The
picture is used in connection with several headings tending to say that
this plaintiff narrowly escaped death because she was careless of her
own safety. That is not libelous; a count for defamation was dropped
out in the course of the trial. But we are not now talking about liabil-
ity for defamation. We are talking about the privilege to invade her
interest in being left alone.72
Other factors also distinguish defamation from false light; these additional
factors, however, do not affect whether a false light cause of action is needed to
provide otherwise remediless plaintiffs with a viable claim for relief.7 3 Thus, the
68. Renwick, 310 N.C. at 325, 312 S.E.2d at 413. The Renwick court expressed its belief that
nominal damages and injunctive relief in false light cases only further threaten first amendment
freedoms. Id.
69. See supra note 61.
70. 192 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951).
71. Id. at 978. There was no evidence that plaintiff was contributorily negligent. Approxi-
mately a year and a half after the accident, however, a picture of plaintiff lying injured in the street
was published by defendant in connection with a feature article titled, "They Ask to Be Killed." The
article concerned pedestrian highway safety. Although the court determined that the use of the
picture did not defame plaintiff, it stated that the picture strongly suggested that plaintiff's careless-
ness was at least partly to blame for her accident. Therefore, the court concluded that the evidence
supported an inference that the juxtaposition of the picture and the article depicted plaintiff in a false
light. The court upheld a damage judgment for plaintiff. Id.; see supra note 60-61 and accompany-
ing text; infra note 72 and accompanying text.
72. Leverton, 192 F.2d at 977-78.
73. One commentator has advanced the proposition that the false light requirement that the
falsehood be "highly offensive to a reasonable person," RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 652E
(1977), means that a higher degree of falsity must be proven for false light claims than for defama-
tion actions. See Comment, supra note 23, at 120 (asserting that the "highly offensive" standard
means the statement must be "substantially or materially false"). But cf. Comment, supra note 61,
at 120-21 (asserting that "defamation is facially more outrageous" than false light).
A second and more minor distinction between false light and defamation involves the publica-
tion requirement. Defamation requires only a private communication. This requirement is satisfied
even if the falsehood is conveyed only to a limited group of people. False light, however, requires a
"public" communication. Thus, the general public must understand that the plaintiff is the subject
of the false statement. See Comment, supra note 23, at 128; Note, Defamation, Privacy and the First
Amendment, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1016, 1024 n.34. Some authorities have advocated liberalizing of the
false light publication requirement, and one court has instituted an intermediate "particular public"
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crucial distinction is the interest that the plaintiff is seeking to protect; some
nondefamatory statements harm this interest.
Conceding that the North Carolina Supreme Court predicated its Renwick
decision on the debatable premise that false light and defamation protect the
same interest, there nevertheless is significant support for the court's rationale
that a false light cause of action largely is a redundant remedy. In addition to
the common explanation that false light claims already are covered by tradi-
tional defamation actions, 74 some authorities suggest that false light claims also
are compensable under a theory of intentional infliction of mental distress.
75
Even assuming the validity of these arguments, however, the real controversy
arises over the need for a false light cause of action for false statements that are
neither defamatory nor rise to the level of intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
One commentator recently suggested that a false light cause of action is not
necessary, even for nondefamatory statements, because such statements fre-
quently fit under one of Prosser's other invasion of privacy torts. 76 Although
this argument is somewhat persuasive, it manifests two weaknesses. First, even
though some claims fall under more than one of Prosser's privacy torts, each of
the torts has its own peculiar requirements. 77 Second, this analysis presupposes
that Prosser's other privacy torts have been adopted by the jurisdiction. A re-
view of the present status of the privacy torts, however, reveals that many states
as yet have not recognized all four privacy torts;78 some states that have rejected
the false light tort also have not adopted one or more of the other privacy
torts. 7 9
Moreover, acceptance of the other privacy torts without recognition of false
publication requirement. See Beaumont v. Brown, 401 Mich. 80, 105, 257 N.W.2d 522, 531 (1977)
(defining "particular public" publication as exposure of "private facts to a public whose knowledge
of those facts would be embarrassing to the plaintiff").
74. See supra notes 43-57 and accompanying text; see also Beaumont v. Brown, 65 Mich. App.
455, 237 N.W.2d 501, 505 (1975) (stating that the invasion of privacy tort overlaps with the defama-
tion tort), rev'd on other grounds, 401 Mich. 80, 257 N.W.2d 522 (1977); Note, supra note 47, at 364
n.60 (noting that false light cases often are covered by defamation).
75. See Beaumont v. Brown, 65 Mich. App. 455, 237 N.W.2d 501, 505 (1975), rev'd on other
grounds, 401 Mich. 80, 257 N.W.2d 522 (1977). Generally, strict requirements must be satisfied to
recover under the tort of intentional infliction of mental distress. See Byrd, Recovery for Mental
Anguish in North Carolina, 58 N.C.L. REv. 435, 460-63 (1980) (noting that a common requirement
for recovery is proof of "severe emotional distress intentionally or recklessly caused by extreme and
outrageous conduct"). Because an intentional infliction claim is difficult to establish, it is questiona-
ble whether intentional infliction of mental distress is a realistic and feasible alternative theory for a
potential false light plaintiff.
76. Ellis, supra note 52, at 1117; see supra note 18. For a general discussion of the four privacy
torts, see NV. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 19, § 117.
77. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
78. See Kovner, supra note 20, at 366-92. Kovner surveyed North Carolina law prior to Ren-
wick and found that North Carolina recognized the false light and appropriation types of invasion of
privacy. Id. at 384-85. The North Carolina Court of Appeals, in dictum, also had assumed the
existence of an intrusion cause of action. See Morrow v. King's Dep't Stores, 57 N.C. App. 13, 22-
23, 290 S.E.2d 732, 738 (1982); Kovner, supra note 20, at 384-85. There apparently is no indication
whether North Carolina courts would recognize the public disclosure of private facts type of inva-
sion of privacy. Thus, appropriation is the only invasion of privacy cause of action unequivocally
sanctioned in North Carolina.
79. See Kovner, supra note 20, at 366-92.
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light sometimes would allow a remedy when a defendant has committed a wrong
no more serious or harmful than publicity portraying the plaintiff in a false light.
For example, it would be patently illogical to recognize a privacy action for
public disclosure of private facts while refusing to recognize a false light claim. 80
Recognizing public disclosure while declining to recognize false light would lead
to the anomalous result that a statement made regarding the plaintiff is actiona-
ble if it is true but is not actionable if it is false and nondefamatory. 81
The false light tort also has been criticized as providing a convenient means
for plaintiffs with weak cases to avoid many of the restrictions and limitations of
defamation actions.82 Some courts and other authorities have resolved this
anomaly by imposing the defamation defenses and limitations on false light
claims when the underlying false statement is defamatory.8 3
When the false publicity is also defamatory so that either [a false
light or a defamation] action can be maintained by the plaintiff, it is
arguable that limitations of long standing that have been found desira-
ble for the action for defamation should not be successfully evaded by
proceeding upon a different theory of later origin, in the development
of which the attention of the courts has not been directed to the
limitations.8 4
Under this analysis, defamation defenses and limitations, however, do not apply
to the false light action if the statement that gives rise to the claim is nondefama-
tory. Since false light is similar to defamation in that both compensate plaintiffs
for injuries resulting from false statements published about them, it would be
logical to impose the traditional defamation limitations on all false light claims,
80. Comment, supra note 61, at 113. The primary distinction between public disclosure and
false light is that public disclosure permits plaintiffs to recover when true private information about
the plaintiff has been disclosed to the public; false light permits recovery for the publication of false-
hoods about the plaintiff. Both causes of action, however, require that the publicized material be
"highly offensive" to a reasonable person. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 19, § 117, at 856-
68.
81. Comment, supra note 61, at 113. But see W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 19, § 117,
at 865. Prosser and Keeton note that:
Recovery for an invasion of privacy on the ground that the plaintiff was depicted in a false
light makes sense only when the account, if true, would not have been actionable as an
invasion of privacy. In other words, the outrageous character of the publicity comes about
in part by virtue of the fact that some part of the matter reported was false and deliberately
SO.
82. See, eg., Rinsley v. Brandt, 446 F. Supp. 850, 858 (D. Kan. 1977) (holding that a libel
claim is barred by the statute of limitations but the false light claim arising from the identical facts is
not barred); Wade, supra note 67, at 1121 ("Mhe great majority of defamation actions can now be
brought for invasion of the right of privacy and. . . many of the restrictions and limitations of libel
and slander can be avoided."); Note, supra note 47, at 364 ("The denial of a remedy in. . . [false
light] cases seems preferable to a complete abrogation of the defamation limitations.").
83. See Smith v. Esquire, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 967, 970 (D. Md. 1980) (applying one-year statute
of limitations for defamation actions to a false light cause of action: "[W]here the basis of the cause
of action is the false nature of the publication, Le., a defamation, the action should be governed by
the various limitations placed on an action for defamation."); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J. Super. 446,
464-65, 371 A.2d 380, 390 (Law Div. 1977) (holding that absolute and qualified privileges that
traditionally have been associated with defamation actions apply to false light claims).
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E comment e (1977). There is very little author-
ity to support this proposition. Id.
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including those based on nondefamatory statements.8 5
The second major reason offered by the Renwick court for not recognizing
the false light tort is the tendency of such recognition "to add to the tension
already existing between the First Amendment and the law of torts."'8 6 In ex-
pressing its concern that sanctioning a false light cause of action would impede
the healthy and legitimate function of a free press, the court quoted Time, Inc. v.
Hill,87 in which the United States Supreme Court had addressed this issue.88 In
Hill the Court held that the "actual malice" standard formulated in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan 9 for "public figure" defamation plaintiffs also applied to
plaintiffs relying on a false light theory if the allegedly false statement concerned
a matter of "public interest." 90
The Renwick court, however, employed flawed logic in determining that
first amendment considerations warrant the refusal to recognize a false light
tort. Although the court implicitly expressed its belief that first amendment
concerns are not sufficiently compelling in defamation actions to disallow a defa-
mation tort, 91 it concluded that such concerns justify the prohibition of false
light claims. Renwick suggests that false light defendants require greater state-
85. If certain limitations are believed necessary for defamation actions-which involve false-
hoods generally held to be more offensive than nondefamatory, false light falsehoods-then the pol-
icy reasons supporting imposition of such limitations would be at least as strong for the false light
tort.
Discreditable remarks by the media will usually be defamatory as well, and even when they
are not. . ., it probably makes sense to treat them as if they were. Insofar as privacy as
such is in issue, the defamation rules are less obviously pertinent-though analysis suggests
that the issues are often the same and call for similar treatment.
Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1205, 1274 (1976).
The qualified and absolute privilege defenses to a defamation action, see W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
supra note 19, §§ 114-115, should be carried over into the false light field. All procedural restric-
tions on defamation actions, such as statutes of limitation, retraction statutes, bond requirement
statutes, and special damages pleading requirements (at least when the publication is not actionable
per se), also should be applied in the false light context. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS
§ 652E comment e (1977); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 19, § 117, at 867-68. Signifi-
cantly, the United States Supreme Court has imposed all constitutional limitations applicable to
defamation actions on false light claims. See infra notes 89-90, 94-96 and accompanying text.
86. Renwick, 310 N.C. at 323, 312 S.E.2d at 412.
87. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
88. Renwick, 310 N.C. at 325, 312 S.E.2d at 413.
89. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In Sullivan, the Supreme Court had held:
The constitutional guarantees require.., a federal rule that prohibits a public official
from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless
he proves that the statement was made with "actual malice"-that is, with knowledge that
it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
Id. at 279-80.
90. Hill, 385 U.S. at 387-88, 390-91. It is ironic that the Renwick court cited and quoted Hill
so extensively in an attempt to support its decision not to recognize a false light cause of action. The
irony lies in the fact that in Hill the Supreme Court addressed this same issue and implicitly deter-
mined that the "actual malice" standard provided sufficient protection for defendants' first amend-
ment interests. Id. at 390-91.
91. This conclusion is implicit in the Renwick decision; it expressed no concern that the Sulli-
van "actual malice" standard inadequately protected first amendment rights when employed in a
defamation case. The court, however, determined that false light actions unreasonably infringe on
first amendment freedoms even when the Sullivan test is applied. Renwick, 310 N.C. at 326, 312
S.E.2d at 413.
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court protection than defamation defendants;92 the Sullivan "actual malice"
test, however, provides greater constitutional protection to false light defendants
as a class than to defamation defendants. 93 In the 1974 Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc. decision, 94 the United States Supreme Court held that only "public official"
and "public figure" plaintiffs must prove "actual malice" to recover in a defama-
tion action.95 By contrast, Hill requires a much broader group of plaintiffs, in-
cluding private plaintiffs involved in a matter of "public interest," to prove
"actual malice" as a prerequisite to a false light recovery. 96 Thus, false light
defendants are given greater protection from first amendment violations; they do
not require the additional protection of the unavailability of the false light tort.
In Renwick the North Carolina Supreme Court also suggested that the false
light tort's threat to first amendment freedoms is exacerbated because plaintiffs
may recover nominal damages even absent proof of actual harm.97 Although
92. By suggesting that first amendment concerns are compelling as to false light but not as to
defamation, the court implies that Supreme Court cases have sufficiently eliminated the threat in
defamation cases but not false light cases.
93. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342-43, 346-48 (1974); Hill, 385 U.S. at
387-88.
94. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
95. Id. at 342-43, 346-48. The Court held that private plaintiffs would not be required to prove
"actual malice" to recover for defamation. Id. at 347. Explaining its decision, the Court stated,
"[S]o long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the
appropriate standard of liability for a publisher. . . of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private
individual." Id.
Gertz also indicated that mere involvement in "community and professional affairs" does not
make an individual a "public figure" or "public official"; the Court seemed intent on limiting the
definitions of "public figures" and "public officials." Id. at 351-52.
96. Hill, 385 U.S. at 387-88 ("We hold that the constitutional protections for speech and press
preclude the application of. . . [a false light cause of action] to redress false reports of matters of
public interest in the absence of proof [of 'actual malice'].") (emphasis added). Arguably, any news
report is, by definition, "of public interest."
One commentator has sought to clarify this confusion by applying a slightly different type of
analysis. The commentator notes that Hill differs from Sullivan in that Hill applies the "actual
malice" standard to the event ("public interest" or newsworthiness) rather than to the person's
status ("public figure" or "public official"). See Comment, supra note 23, at 132-36.
It also has been suggested that broad application of the "actual malice" standard to false light
actions could unfairly burden a person who "became involved in a topic of public concern through
no voluntary, concerted action of her own." Id. at 135-36. Some predict that the United States
Supreme Court eventually will extend Gertz into the false light area by limiting the "actual malice"
requirement to "public figures" and "public officials" in false light actions as a replacement for the
current "public interest" test. See id. at 132-36. The United States Supreme Court declined to
decide this issue in Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 425 (1974).
Of the state and lower federal courts that have addressed this issue, five have applied the Gertz
rule to false light cases involving nonpublic figures and officials, whereas three have followed the Hill
rule requiring even private plaintiffs involved in matters of "public interest" to prove "actual mal-
ice." See Kovner, supra note 20, at 328. For a case extending the Gertz rule to a false light cause of
action, see Rinsley v. Brandt, 446 F. Supp. 850 (D. Kan. 1977). But see Note, supra note 73, at
1044-45 (arguing that the Hill rule should be retained for false light causes of action to guard against
trivial claims and excessive verdicts).
97. Renwick, 310 N.C. at 325, 312 S.E.2d at 413; see supra note 68. The Renivick court cited
the portion of Flake which held that "the unauthorized use of one's photograph in connection with
an advertisement or other commericial enterprise gives rise to a cause of action which would entitle
the plaintiff, without the allegation and proof of special damages, to a judgment for nominal dam.
ages." Flake, 212 N.C. at 792, 195 S.E. at 64, cited in Renwick, 310 N.C. at 325, 312 S.E.2d at 413.
Neither Renwick nor Flake actually defines the terms "special" and "nominal" damages. It is
reasonable in this context, however, to infer that the technical dictionary definitions were intended.
Special damages are "[t]hose which are the actual, but not the necessary, result of the injury com-
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this criticism is valid, it is weak support for the court's decision to deny recogni-
tion of a false light cause of action. The prerequisites for an award of damages
are within the province of the court;98 thus, if the availability of nominal dam-
ages is a genuine barrier to the acceptance of the false light tort, the court could
have remedied this problem simply by establishing a rule that nominal damages
are unavailable in false light cases.
Under earlier North Carolina cases, there was no binding precedent for
either recognizing or rejecting a false light tort. Furthermore, sound arguments
have been advanced both in favor of and against the reasoning of the Renwick
decision. The strongest support for Renwick is that most falsehoods that are
sufficiently offensive to support a false light claim also will justify a recovery
under one of the traditional defamation theories. In occasional cases, however, a
nondefamatory false statement will cause a reasonable person to suffer substan-
tial mental harm.9 9 Renwick effectively denies relief to these plaintiffs; despite
the small number of potential plaintiffs, this result is unduly harsh and arbitrary.
A practical solution for this dilemma would be to recognize a strictly cir-
cumscribed false light cause of action in which the plaintiff has a high burden of
proving that a reasonable person in like circumstances would suffer serious emo-
tional injury. The Restatement (Second) definition of false light °00 provides an
excellent skeleton upon which to build this narrow false light tort. The en-
hanced burden of proof placed on the plaintiff, in addition to the "actual malice"
test prescribed by the United States Supreme Court, would protect a defendant's
first amendment freedoms adequately. All of the common-law and statutory
defamation defenses and limitations, whether of a substantive or procedural na-
ture, also could be made applicable to the new false light tort. Finally, the types
of damages available to a false light plaintiff could be limited as the court or
legislature deem appropriate. By following these conservative guidelines, needed
relief could be afforded to plaintiffs grievously injured by false but nondefama-
tory statements. At the same time, the independence and viability of the defa-
mation tort and the sanctity of the policies that have influenced its contours
could be maintained.
WALTER D. FISHER, JR.
plained of, and which in fact follow it as a natural and proximate consequence in the particular case,
that is, by reason of special circumstances or conditions." BLACK'S LAW DICmiONARY 354 (5th ed.
1979).
Nominal damages are a trifling sum awarded to a plaintiff in an action, where there is no
substantial loss or injury to be compensated, but still the law recognizes a technical inva-
sion of his rights or a breach of the defendant's duty, or in cases where, although there has
been a real injury, the plaintiff's evidence entirely fails to show its amount.
Id. at 353.
98. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348 (presumed and punitive damages no longer allowed in defama-
tion actions).
99. See, eg., Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951) (discussed supra
notes 61 & 70-72 and accompanying text).
100. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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